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HOW TO BE A SKEPTICAL THEIST AND A 
COMMONSENSE EPISTEMOLOGIST
Perry Hendricks
Trent Dougherty has argued that commonsense epistemology and skeptical 
theism are incompatible. In this paper, I explicate Dougherty’s argument, and 
show that (at least) one popular form of skeptical theism is compatible with 
commonsense epistemology.
1. Introduction
Trent Dougherty1 has argued that commonsense epistemology and 
skeptical theism are incompatible.2 In this paper, I explicate Dougherty’s 
argument, and show that (at least) one popular form of skeptical theism is 
compatible with commonsense epistemology.
2. Preliminaries and Dougherty’s Argument
Dougherty argues as follows:
(1) If commonsense epistemology is correct, then it is relatively easy to jus-
tifiedly believe that there exist instances of intense suffering which an 
omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby 
losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
(2) If it is relatively easy to justifiedly believe that there exist instances of 
intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have 
prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting 
some evil equally bad or worse, then skeptical theism is not a plausible 
response to the problem of evil.
1See his “Epistemological Considerations,” “Further Epistemological Considerations,” 
and “Phenomenal Conservatism.”
2More exactly, he claims that there is at least a superficial tension between commonsense 
epistemology and skeptical theism, and he issues a challenge to skeptical theists to remedy 
this tension. I use my terminology for the sake of simplicity. A referee suggests that this 
makes it appear that I am addressing a straw man. However, as I show below, Dougherty 
is, in fact, committed to the incompatibility of skeptical theism and commonsense episte-
mology, since, by his definitions of them, they entail contradictory propositions (i.e., (7) and 
(8)). See n. 5 for more on this. 
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(3) Therefore, if commonsense epistemology is correct, then skeptical the-
ism is not plausible.3
He states the evidential argument from evil as:
[4] There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omni-
scient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater 
good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
[5] An omnipotent, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any 
intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby 
losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
[6] [Therefore,] there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly 
good being.4
Finally, Dougherty states the skeptical theist position and commonsense 
epistemology as follows:
[MAINSTREAM SKEPTICAL THEISM] The only evidence for [premise (4)] 
is that there are instances of intense suffering for which we cannot think of 
some greater good which would have been lost if it were prevented or some 
evil equally bad or worse which would have resulted if it were prevented, 
and . . . furthermore we have no reason to suppose that we would be able to 
think of such if it existed.5
[COMMONSENSE] If it seems to S that P, then S thereby has a reason to 
believe P.6
So how does COMMONSENSE come into conflict with MAINSTREAM 
SKEPTICAL THEISM? It does so as follows: COMMONSENSE entails that 
S can have evidence or reason7 to affirm premise (4) simply in virtue of the 
fact that it seems to her that there are instances of gratuitous8 evil, and this 




5“Epistemological Considerations,” 173 (emphasis added). He gives several other 
examples of skeptical theism later in his paper. I choose this version only for the sake of con-
venience; everything I say in this paper is applicable to the other forms of skeptical theism 
Dougherty mentions as well. Moreover, he thinks that all skeptical theists are committed to 
MAINSTREAM SKEPTICAL THEISM, since, prior to his above characterization of skeptical 
theism, he says, “Skeptical theists in one way or another reply that . . . ” (“Epistemological 
Considerations,” 173). Hence, he thinks that all skeptical theists are committed to MAIN-
STREAM SKEPTICAL THEISM, and hence what I say about MAINSTREAM SKEPTICAL 
THEISM will apply to his other characterizations of skeptical theism.
6Dougherty, “Phenomenal Conservatism,” 23. This principle is from Michael Huemer’s 
phenomenal conservatism. See, e.g., Huemer, Skepticism and the Veil of Perception, and “Com-
passionate Phenomenal Conservatism.”
7For the sake of simplicity, I will be taking “evidence” and “reason” to be synonymous.
8A gratuitous evil (or instance of suffering) is an evil that God could have prevented 
without losing a greater good or permitting an evil that is equally bad or worse. I will, there-
fore, use the term “gratuitous evil” as shorthand for the instances of intense suffering that 
Dougherty describes in premises (4) and (5).
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(7) Possibly, S is justified in endorsing premise (4) in virtue of the fact 
that it seems to her that premise (4) is true.
MAINSTREAM SKEPTICAL THEISM, on the other hand, claims that the 
only evidence for premise (4) is (and can be) our inability to think of a 
greater good for an instance of intense suffering, and hence the only justi-
fication S can have for endorsing premise (4) is her inability to think of a 
greater good (etc.). Hence, MAINSTREAM SKEPTICAL THEISM entails
(8) It is not possible for S to be justified in endorsing premise (4) in 
virtue of the fact that it seems to her that premise (4) is true.
Thus, COMMONSENSE and MAINSTREAM SKEPTICAL THEISM en-
tail contradictory propositions and are therefore incompatible. Further, 
it follows that, insofar as COMMONSENSE is plausible, MAINSTREAM 
SKEPTICAL THEISM is implausible. Hence premise (2) is true.9
3. A Different Type of Skeptical Theism
The proper response to Dougherty, in my view, is to concede that COM-
MONSENSE and MAINSTREAM SKEPTICAL THEISM are, indeed, 
incompatible. However, it is important to note that MAINSTREAM SKEP-
TICAL THEISM is not a thesis that all skeptical theists endorse. Indeed, 
one of the most popular versions of skeptical theism—Michael Berg-
mann’s10—radically differs from MAINSTREAM SKEPTICAL THEISM. 
We may state it as follows:
BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM: 
ST1 We have no good reason for thinking that the possible goods we know 
of are representative of the possible goods there are.
ST2 We have no good reason for thinking that the possible evils we know of 
are representative of the possible evils there are.
ST3 We have no good reason for thinking that the entailment relations we 
know of between possible goods and the permission of possible evils 
are representative of the entailment relations there are between possi-
ble goods and the permission of possible evils.
9Dougherty brings out the tension between these two positions in a different way than 
I do. He says that MAINSTREAM SKEPTICAL THEISM, if right, must provide S, who 
believes premise (4) on the basis of COMMONSENSE, with a defeater for her COMMON-
SENSE justification. But he doubts that MAINSTREAM SKEPTICAL THEISM can provide 
such a defeater. Hence, a tension has arisen. It should be clear how my reply below equally 
applies to Dougherty’s way of bringing about the tension. (It is worth emphasizing again that 
Dougherty’s definitions of skeptical theism and commonsense epistemology entail proposi-
tions (7) and (8), so my approach is not unfaithful to his basic thesis.).
10See, e.g., Bergmann, “Skeptical Theism and Rowe’s New Evidential Argument from 
Evil,” “Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Evil,” “Commonsense Skeptical Theism,” and 
“Skeptical Theism, Atheism, and Total Evidence Skepticism.”
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ST4 We have no good reason for thinking that the total moral value or dis-
value we perceive in certain complex states of affairs accurately reflects 
the total moral value or disvalue they really have.11
What should be clear is that BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM 
does not make any claims about what evidence can or does justify one 
in endorsing premise (4).12 Rather, it only makes claims about our lack of 
reasons for thinking that certain values (and entailment relations) are rep-
resentative.13 Indeed, as Chris Tucker has pointed out, BERGMANNIAN 
SKEPTICAL THEISM does not defeat all arguments from evil since there 
are arguments that do not make use of an inductive inference that is vul-
nerable to Bergmann’s skeptical theses.14
However, it is important to note that Bergmann never claimed that his 
skeptical theses defeat all arguments from evil! Indeed, he says the fol-
lowing:
[Proponents of BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM] don’t claim that 
their skeptical theses undermine all arguments from evil . . . [BERGMAN-
NIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM is] used by the skeptical theist to target induc-
tive inferences from God-justifying reasons we can think of . . . to the con-
clusion that there are no God-justifying reasons for permitting the evils we 
know of. . . . But this doesn’t show that all arguments from evil rely on inductive 
inferences.15
Thus, the proponent of BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM ought to 
concede that not all evidential arguments from evil are undermined by 
her skeptical theism. Hence, she ought to reject MAINSTREAM SKEP-
TICAL THEISM and allow that there may be multiple ways to motivate or 
justify one in endorsing premise (4).
Since the affirmation of MAINSTREAM SKEPTICAL THEISM is what 
brought the skeptical theist into conflict with COMMONSENSE, Dough-
erty’s challenge is met; the proponent of BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL 
THEISM is not committed to (8), and hence she is not in conflict with (7), 
and thus she is not in conflict with COMMONSENSE. (Indeed, we may 
go further and say that, in principle, one who endorses BERGMANNIAN 
SKEPTICAL THEISM may have reason or justification, by COMMON-
SENSE, to endorse premise (4). More on this later.) Therefore, one may 
endorse both BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM and COMMON-
SENSE; their plausibility is compossible. It follows from this that premise 
11Bergmann “Commonsense Skeptical Theism,” 11–12.
12Of course, the proponent of BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM could go beyond 
the skeptical theses and make claims about what kinds of evidence or justification for 
premise (4) there could (and could not) possibly be. My point is merely that her theses do 
not commit her to doing so.
13Of course, thesis (4) has other implications, but I will gloss over them here for the sake 
of simplicity.
14Tucker, “Why Skeptical Theism Isn’t Skeptical Enough.”
15Bergmann, “Skeptical Theism, Atheism, and Total Evidence Skepticism,” 210 (emphasis 
added). 
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(2) of Dougherty’s argument is false: Skeptical theism does not entail that 
one cannot relatively easily justifiedly believe that there are instances of 
gratuitous evil—or, at least, one popular form of skeptical theism does 
not entail this.16 Therefore, Dougherty’s conclusion is avoided: Skeptical 
theism—or, at least one form of it—is not incompatible with COMMON-
SENSE; COMMONSENSE, if plausible, does not render skeptical theism 
implausible.17
4. Is BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM’s Scope Narrow?
One might wonder whether the compatibility of BERGMANNIAN SKEP-
TICAL THEISM with COMMONSENSE is a double-edged sword: While 
it is an advantage for BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM to be able 
to accommodate COMMONSENSE, it appears to narrow its scope and 
thus make it an ineffective response to many arguments from evil. In this 
section, I will address this issue, arguing that (a) BERGMANNIAN SKEP-
TICAL THEISM, even when conjoined with COMMONSENSE, still hits 
its original target, and hence its scope is not narrowed, and that (b) BERG-
MANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM is still, for many persons, an effective 
response to many arguments from evil.
In accommodating COMMONSENSE, it might be objected that the 
proponent of BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM leaves herself vul-
nerable many arguments from evil, such as the one contained in (4)–(6). 
Hence, its scope is narrowed.18 The reasoning behind this charge is two-
fold. In the first place, BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM itself does 
nothing to undermine either premise (4) or premise (5); BERGMANNIAN 
SKEPTICAL THEISM targets certain inductive inferences (explained 
below), none of which are mentioned in premises (4) or (5). In the second 
place, the compatibility of BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THIESM and 
COMMONSENSE entails that one can have COMMONSENSE justifi-
cation for arguments from evil (e.g., (4)–(6)); since BERGMANNIAN 
SKEPTICAL THEISM is compatible with COMMONSENSE, its proponent 
cannot wield it to combat arguments from evil predicated on, or justified 
by, COMMONSENSE. Thus, argues the objector, BERGMANNIAN SKEP-
TICAL THEISM’s scope is narrowed; it does not address arguments from 
evil that do not make use of an inductive inference, nor does it address 
COMMONSENSE based arguments from evil. Is this objection successful?
16It is worth noting that the above defense can also be applied to Daniel Howard-Snyder’s 
stronger “Agnostic Theses” defended in his “Epistemic Humility,” as well as other forms of 
skeptical theism.
17A referee asks whether a person S would be justified by COMMONSENSE in rejecting 
BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM if it seems to her to be false. If the answer is “Yes,” 
then, the referee says, COMMONSENSE and BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM are 
not compatible. This is incorrect. COMMONSENSE and BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL 
THEISM are compatible in the sense that one does not entail the denial of the other. That fact 
does not change by conceding that some persons in some situations may have COMMON-
SENSE justification for rejecting BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM.
18This objection is owed to a referee.
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It is true that the proponent of both BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL 
THEISM and COMMONSENSE ought to concede that, for example, if it 
seems to S that premises (4) and (5) are true, then S may justifiedly accept 
(6). (Note that while some allege that they have this type of justification, 
I doubt that premise (4)—or any proposition asserting that there is gratu-
itous evil—seems true to anyone. It is analogous, in my view, to a person, 
after witnessing a natural human birth, claiming that it seems to her that 
there is no possible pain more intense than giving birth. Or to a person, 
upon seeing Mount Everest, claiming that it seems that Mount Everest is 
the tallest mountain in the universe. Even if one testified to having such 
seemings, I would doubt the veracity of her testimony—she would appear 
merely to be confused; it is doubtful that she understands what she is 
saying.19 But I will put my incredulity aside for the moment.)
This outcome will be true for any other version of the argument from 
evil: so long as the premises seem to be true to S, she will be justified in 
accepting the conclusion. Or, more concretely, BERGMANNIAN SKEP-
TICAL THEISM permits that S may, via COMMONSENSE, justifiedly 
conclude that God (at least probably) does not exist if an instance of evil 
seems gratuitous to S and S holds that God’s existence is incompatible 
with gratuitous evil.
However, the crucial issue is whether this concession actually narrows 
the scope of BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM. Does it? I submit 
that it does not. Recall that BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM 
targets arguments from evil that make use, implicitly or explicitly, of in-
ductive inferences. More specifically, it targets arguments that make use of 
inductive inferences like the following:
THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE:20 We do not know of any morally justi-
fying reason for God to allow instances of intense suffering; therefore, 
probably, there is no such reason.
BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM renders THE NOSEEUM INFER-
ENCE (and other inferences like it) bad. Hence, arguments from evil that 
rely on it will be undermined.21 COMMONSENSE does not magically turn 
19If a person really claimed that it seemed to her that Mount Everest is the tallest moun-
tain in the universe, we ought to ask her if she just means that Mount Everest seems very tall. 
Presumably, this—or something like this—is what she meant by her utterance. Similarly, if a 
person claims that it seems to her that there are instances of suffering such that the elimina-
tion of such instances would not have resulted in a loss of a greater good or a production of 
an evil that is equally bad or worse, we ought to ask her if she just means that an evil seems 
particularly intense or bad. Presumably, this—or something like this—is what she meant by 
her utterance. (If she doubles down and says that she really does mean that it seems to her 
that there are instances of suffering such that their elimination would not have resulted in 
the loss of a greater good (etc.), then I would, again, doubt the veracity of her testimony or 
whether she understood the question.)
20This term is taken from Stephen Wykstra “Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments from Evil.”
21In this essay, I merely assume that BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM undermines 
THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE. This is because (a) this has been substantially argued for 
elsewhere (see below), and (b) my paper is concerned primarily with the compatibility of 
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a bad inference into a good one, and hence COMMONSENSE does not 
narrow the scope of BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM.
Here it might be objected that if it seems to S that THE NOSEEUM IN-
FERENCE is a good inference, then S thereby has justification for affirming 
it. And hence COMMONSENSE does undermine the efficacy—narrow 
the scope—of BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM.
It is, of course, possible that it seems to S that THE NOSEEUM INFER-
ENCE is good. But S, in such a case, would not have justification via 
COMMONSENSE for her belief, for she has a defeater for it. That is, the 
fact that BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM renders THE NOSEEUM 
INFERENCE bad is a defeater for S’s seeming; it blocks—or, at least, nul-
lifies—any justification S would have via COMMONSENSE.22 (This is 
similar to a situation in which it seems to S that a stick in the water is bent 
and yet she lacks justification via COMMONSENSE for her belief that it 
is bent, since she has an undercutting defeater for her seeming.) Hence, 
COMMONSENSE does not threaten to narrow the scope of BERGMAN-
NIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM. It does not provide justification for THE 
NOSEEUM INFERENCE.
So, the original target of BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM—ar-
guments that are, implicitly or explicitly, predicated on THE NOSEEUM 
INFERENCE—is still hit, and COMMONSENSE does nothing to un-
dermine this. This, I will argue, enables BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL 
THEISM to remain an effective response to many arguments from evil for 
many of its proponents. The reason I use the qualification “for many” is 
because COMMONSENSE delivers person-relative justification: If it seems 
to S that p and it does not seem to R that p, only S will have justification 
for p. The relevance of this will become clear below.
To see how BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM can remain an ef-
fective response for many to arguments from evil, consider the following 
skeptical theism and commonsense epistemology, not with arguments in favor of skeptical 
theism. For defenses of the thesis that BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM undermines 
THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE, see, e.g., Bergmann “Skeptical Theism and Rowe’s New Evi-
dential Argument from Evil” and “Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Evil,” Hudson “The 
Father of Lies?” and A Grotesque in the Garden, and my “Sceptical Theism and the Evil-God 
Challenge.” 
22Perhaps one might object that the defeater is the other way around: S’s COMMON-
SENSE justification gives her a defeater for her belief that BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL 
THEISM undermines THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE. I do not, at this point, wish to wade 
into the deep waters of defeaters here, but I will briefly explain why I do not think that 
this objection works. BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM functions as an undercutting 
defeater for THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE: It provides S with knowledge that it is a bad 
method of producing beliefs, and therefore it gives her reason to remain agnostic about the 
product of THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE (i.e., that there probably is no morally justifying 
reason for intense instances of suffering)—at least that is what we have assumed in this essay 
(see n. 21). Thus, since THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE is known to be bad, a seeming will not 
erase this fact, and this is a defeater for any seeming that THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE is 
good. Consider another example: If S knows that X is a bad method for producing beliefs, 
then the fact that it seems to her that X is a good method will not provide her with justifica-
tion for holding beliefs produced by X. 
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scenario. Suppose that the proponent of the argument from evil as stated 
in (4)–(6), call her “P,” presents her interlocutor, call her “L,” with premise 
(4). L, we may suppose, is a proponent of BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL 
THEISM and COMMONSENSE. However, L does not have COMMON-
SENSE justification for premise (4) (i.e., it does not seem to her to be 
true). What is P to do here? Well, P must find some other way to motivate 
premise (4) for L—she must give L good reason to endorse premise (4). 
What reason could she give? One way—perhaps the only way—would be 
for P to present L with THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE. Suppose that P in-
deed uses THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE to argue in favor of premise (4). 
What is L to make of P’s argument? She will not be impressed or moved by 
P’s case for premise (4). This is because, as mentioned above, BERGMAN-
NIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM renders THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE bad, 
and hence premise (4) will remain unmotivated for L. Thus, P’s original 
argument has not gotten off the ground—she has not given L good reason 
to accept premise (4).23
Therefore, I conclude, BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM is still 
relevant to the argument contained in (4)–(6)—at least, it is relevant if the 
person entertaining it does not have justification via COMMONSENSE for 
premise (4).
This same problem will arise for any argument from evil that contains 
a premise stating either that there is gratuitous evil or that there probably 
is gratuitous evil. If L does not have COMMONSENSE justification for the 
premise about gratuitous evil, then P will have to offer additional support 
for said premise.24 If the additional support amounts to THE NOSEEUM 
23To make this clearer, we can consider a different scenario. Suppose, instead, that P owns 
a 500-acre strawberry field and that she prides herself on having no rotten strawberries in 
her field. In an attempt to convince L that there are no rotten strawberries in her field, P 
takes L to her field and they examine five acres of it. After finding no rotten strawberries, P 
asks L whether she now believes her. Does L now accept that P has no rotten strawberries 
in her field? If L has reason to doubt that the five acres they searched are representative of 
the whole garden, then she does not accept P’s claim. If she has reason to doubt that the five 
acres are representative, then she and P not finding a rotten strawberry is scant evidence for 
there being none in her field. If she has reason to doubt that the contents of the 495 acres 
of the garden resemble the five acres that they searched through, should she regard their 
coming up empty-handed in their search as good reason to think that there are not rotten 
strawberries in the rest of the garden? The answer is simple: She should not. As it is with the 
strawberry garden, so it is with P’s argument for premise (4): L should not accept it.
24I suspect that some arguments that do not mention gratuitous evil at all may never-
theless be vulnerable to BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM. For example, Paul Draper 
(“Pain and Pleasure”; “The Skeptical Theist” “Limitations of Pure Skeptical Theism”) has 
argued that P(O/HI) >! P(O/G), and that this gives us reason to reject G. (Read: the proba-
bility of our observations about the patterns of pain and pleasure in our world (O) on the 
hypothesis that sentient beings and nature in our world are not the product of a benevolent 
(or malevolent) non-human person (HI) is antecedently much greater than the probability 
of O on the hypothesis that God, an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good being, is the 
responsible for the existence of sentient beings and nature (G) (“The Skeptical Theist,” 189).) 
However if we find P(O/G) to be inscrutable, then Draper must give us reason to assign a 
(presumably, low) value to it; if P(O/G) is truly inscrutable, then we cannot reasonably say 
that O is more likely on another proposition. One such reason might go like this: if there is no 
morally justifying reason for God allowing (or causing) O, then P(O/G) is low. We know of no 
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INFERENCE (or something like it), then BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL 
THEISM comes into play, leaving the premise unmotivated for L and thus 
undermining P’s argument. Insofar as many (most? all?) persons do not 
have COMMONSENSE justification for believing that there is gratuitous 
evil,25 many arguments from evil will require additional support for 
their premises asserting that there is gratuitous evil. And insofar as the 
additional support offered amounts to THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE (or 
something like it), BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM will continue 
to apply to many arguments. So, I suggest that BERGMANNIAN SKEP-
TICAL THEISM is still an effective response to many arguments from evil 
for many persons; for those who lack COMMONSENSE justification for 
believing there is gratuitous evil, BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM 
continues to undercut many arguments from evil.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have seen that (at least) one form of skeptical theism is 
compatible with COMMONSENSE, and hence we ought to reject premise 
(2) of Dougherty’s argument. I do not claim that BERGMANNIAN SKEP-
TICAL THEISM is the only form of skeptical theism that is compatible 
with COMMONSENSE—there are no doubt others. My point is merely 
that not all skeptical theists are committed to their incompatibility.26 A 
lesson from this is that we ought to talk about the implications of types of 
skeptical theism, rather than skeptical theism simpliciter.27
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